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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOENE NELSON, 
Plaintiff, Appellant and 
Respondent on Cross Appeal, 
-vs.-
EARL LEROY HUTCHINGS 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Cross Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
9929 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries sus-
tained by her when she was walking south on Second East 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah in a crosswalk with the red 
light in her favor and was struck by the defendant's car 
which was making a left turn to the west on Sixth South 
Street. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case 'ras tried to a jury which granted judgment 
to the plaintiff for $3,550.00. The court granted defendant's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment granted by the 
court and reinstatement of the jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought action against defendant to recover 
damages for injuries sustained in an auto-pedestrian aeci-
dent that occurred at the intersection of Second East and 
Sixth South streets in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 28, 1962 
at approximately 7:20 P.M. Sixth South Street is a four-
lane blacktop level highway running east and west and Sec-
ond East is a four-lane street running north and south, and 
is also level. Both streets are approximately 90 feet wide 
( R.85) . There were painted crosswalks on all sides of the 
intersection. The east line of the crosswalk on the west side 
of the intersection was 14 feet 3 inches from the west side 
of Second East Street ( R87). The crosswalk itself was seven 
feet five inches wide. The crosswalk south of the intersection 
is approximately the same distance from the south side of 
the intersection as the west crosswalk is from the west side 
of the intersection. Traffic at the intersection was controlled 
by a single semaphore signal located in the center of the 
intersection (RlOl) diplaying the usual red, green and yel-
low signals, in that order. 
The plaintiff approached the intersection from the north 
and was walking south along the west side of Second East 
Street. When she arrived at the intersection the light was 
red for east-west traffic and not knowing how long it had 
been red she waited for it to turn green and then red again 
(R102, 129). When the light turned red the second time 
she looked to the east, to the north and to the west and 
saw no cars approaching (Rl02). She looked to the south 
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and ~aw a car facing north and observed it proceed-
ing forward in a northerly direction, but no signal for 
a left turn was being given by the driver (R102, 165) and 
~he assumed it would continue directly north (R102). She 
traveled at her normal walking gait within the crosswalk 
approximately 39 feet six inches from the north side of the 
street when she was struck by the defendant's vehicle ( R87, 
Exh. 1 P). The impact occurred about 17 feet eleven inches 
west of the west side of Second East. As she walked across 
the street Mrs. Nelson looked mostly ahead but also looked 
to the west and glanced to the east ( R130, 133) but didn't 
notice defendant's car again until just before the impact. She 
glanced down at her purse which she was carrying in her 
right hand, and which struck her leg just before the accident 
occurred (R102). As she glanced at the purse she heard 
the noise of a car and glanced to the east as the car struck 
her. She saw the car but it was too late to do anything (R103). 
She was struck by the right front of the defendant's car 
and knocked or carried and thrown approximately 22 feet 
from the point of impact ( R88). 
The road surface was dry, it was a clear day and visibil-
ty was good except for the fact that the sun was low in the 
"·estern sky and created a glary condition ( R89). 
The defendant stopped at the south side of the inter-
section. The light was red. When the light turned green he 
proceeded forward at a speed of five to ten miles per hour 
( R173). He traveled north until he was about to the center 
of the intersection, or to the semaphore signal, when he 
started to turn left ( Rl7 4). As he turned to the left the sun 
struck him in the eyes ( R17 4). The defendant knew that 
the sun would be low in the sky (R175). Although the sun 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
struck the defendant in the eyes he continued forward with-
out application of brakes until his wife said, "Stop" just 
before the impact with Mrs. Nelson. The defendant did not 
see Mrs. Nelson at any time before the impact occurred 
(R175). 
ARGUMENT 
PO,INT I 
THE CO,URT CO,MMITTED ERROR IN RULING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AS A MATTER o~F LAW AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VER-
DICT. 
In determining on appeal whether questions of negli-
gence and contributory negligence were properly submitted 
to the jury, the reviewing court must review the evidence, 
together with every inference fairly arising therefrom, in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Coombs vs. 
Perry, 2 Utah(2) 381, 275 P(2) 680. The plaintiff was 
the prevailing party under the jury verdict. 
The court granted a judgment notwithstanding verdict 
( R68) to the defendant in this case on the basis of the deci-
sion handed down in Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 P(2) 495, Utah, 
1949, 144 Ut. 505. The court in that case held the deceased 
Mingus was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in fail-
ing to look for traffic before crossing 13th East Street in 
an unmarked crosswalk, at its intersection with Westminster 
Avenue. 
The testimony with respect to deceased's conduct as 
given by his wife was as follows: 
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··As they stepped off the curb and started easterly 
aero~~ 13th East Street, decedent was to her left or 
north~ that he looked neither to the left nor right, 
but looked straight ahead as they proceeded across 
the street~ that he ~aid nothing to her about approach-
ing traffic.'' 
The facts in our case are substantially different from 
tho~e in the !1/ingus vs. Olsson case. In our case the plaintiff 
testified that she did look prior to crossing the street. She 
looked in all directions. The light was red in her favor. 
She saw the vehicle of the defendant at the south side of the 
intersection. No signal was being given for a left turn. She 
then continued into the crosswalk watching ahead of her 
and also looking to the west and glancing to the east. She 
looked down at her purse just prior to the impact when the 
purse struck her leg as she thought that the purse might have 
con1e open. 
An independent witness testified he saw her look in 
each direction before starting across the intersection. (R83) 
This set of facts is different from that set forth in Mingus vs. 
Olsson and the rule as stated in Mingus vs. Olsson is not 
controlling in this case. There is no dispute about her having 
looked adequately before starting across the intersection. A 
different rule of law was applicable to the respective parties 
'rith respect to right-of-way. In the Mingus vs. Olsson case 
the deceased left a place of safety and stepped into a posi-
tion of peril when the right-of-way was very doubtful. In 
our case the right-of-way of Mrs. Nelson is very clear as 
she had a red light in her favor. 
In the case of Coombs vs. Perry, supra, the plaintiff 
and her friend were walking south on the east side of Wash-
ington Boulevard in Ogden between 26th and 27th Streets 
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in the evening about twilight. As they reached the mid-block 
crosswalk, plaintiff looked to the north and saw a bus 1 ~ 
blocks away. They decided to cross the street to see if it was 
her bus. Plaintiff walked west to the middle of the street 
and looked north. Seeing no vehicles between herself and 
the comer, she took a few steps westerly when she suddenly 
became a ware of headlights to the north and was immediate-
ly struck by defendant's automobile. She saw defendant 
standing over her and said, 
"Where on earth did you come from? I didn't see you." 
The plaintiff's friend watched plaintiff stop and look to 
the north. She said she also looked and didn't see any cars 
coming. The court said: 
"It is to be borne in mind that although the motor-
ist and pedestrian are both required to exercise the 
same degree of care, that of the ordinary prudent 
person under the circumtances, that standard imposes 
upon the motorist a greater amount of caution than 
upon the pedestrian because of the potential danger 
to others in the operation of an automobile. Inas-
much as it is incontrovertible that plaintiff was struck 
in a marked crosswalk and defendant himself says 
he didn't see her at all it seems unquestionable that 
a jury question existed as to whether he kept a proper 
lookout for pedestrians at the crosswalk, or, even 
if it were to be assumed that he did so, whether he 
observed due care in affording plaintiff the right-
of-way to which she was entitled." 
The Court said: 
"The problem of importance was whether plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
I " aw. 
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'-Was the evidence so clear and compelling that all 
reasonable minds must say that it was established by 
a preponderance of the evidence that she was negli-
gent and that such was a proximate cause of her in-
jury?" 
The Court said: 
''In contending that this question must be answered 
affirmatively defendant relies upon the proposition 
that the plaintiff must be deemed to have seen what 
was there to be seen." Citing a number of cases 
handed down by Utah and other courts in support 
thereof. 
The Court further said: 
"Analysis of such authorities will reveal significant 
factual differences from the case at bar. Usually the 
pedestrian had just stepped from the curb into a traf-
fic lane or out from behind a vehicle or other object 
obstructing the view into the path of an oncoming ve-
h. I , ICe. 
Typical of such cases is Mingus vs. Olsson. The court then 
reasoned that the defendant's vehicle may not have been on 
\\~ashington Boulevard at the time the plaintiff and her com-
panion looked. However, the court further stated that the 
affirmance of the judgment need not, however, rest upon 
the hypothesis that defendant was not on Washington Boule-
vard at the time plaintiff stopped and looked. Assuming that 
defendant 'ras there and hence that plaintiff either saw or 
should haYe seen him, the trial court properly submitted 
the questions of her negligence and whether it proximately 
caused her injury to the jury. 
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"The salient point is that plaintiff as a pedestrian 
in a marked crosswalk had the right-of-way. The 
right-of-way simply means this: That if two persons 
are so proceeding that if they continued their course 
there would be a danger of collision, the disfavored 
one, defendant, must give away, and the favored one, 
plaintiff, may proceed; and the favored one may 
assume that this will be done. It is, of course, recog-
nized that the right-of-way rule would not apply if 
when the favored one approached the crossing point 
the disfavored one was so close that in due care he 
could not or should not reasonably be expected to 
. '' give way. 
Further quoting: 
"And the jury could reasonably find that in due 
care she might rely upon the assumption that he 
would so (slow down, turn to his right, or stop, if 
necessary, to afford the plaintiff the right-of-way 
and avoid striking her) until something occurred 
to warn her to the contrary. The evidence fails to 
disclose that any horn was sounded or that there 
was any other indication manifest which could have 
been observed by her to indicate that he was not 
going to afford her the right-of-way until it was too 
late to do anything to save herself from peril. *** 
Consideration must be given not only to the fact that 
she had the right-of-way upon which she could place 
some reliance, but also that a pedestrian crossing a 
busy street must be constantly vigilant for her safety 
with respect to all of the conditions around her. Even 
if a car is s~een approaching, unless it is so positioned 
as to constitute an immediate hazard to her, she is 
not necessarily obliged to focus full and undivided 
attention on that particular car and so cakulate 
her entire conduct as to avoid beng struck by it. She 
need not anticipate that the driver will speed, fail 
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to obser-ve .. or control his car, or fail to afford her 
thfl! right-of-way or otherwise be negligent unless in 
dut· care she observes or should observe something 
to warn her of such improper conduct." (Bracketed 
n1aterial our~.) (Italics ours.) 
Quoting again: 
"In accord with such thought is the case of Olsen vs. 
Peerless Laundry, Ill Wash. 660, 191 P 756, where-
in the court reiterated the rule that a pedestrian has 
the duty to look for approaching vehicles but said 
that after doing so whether ordinary care requires 
him to continue to look in the same direction or to 
look again, depends on other attendant circumstances, 
holding that the question of his contributory negli-
gence was one of fact for the jury. Similarly, in 
Jensen vs. Culbert, where a woman was struck down 
at an intersection, the court said that there being 
nothing to show to the contrary, it must be assumed 
that she saw the car, but inasmuch as the law gave 
her the right-of-way and the car must have been more 
than 100 feet away when she started to cross, it could 
reasonably be found within her duty of due care 
to assume that the car would afford her the right-
of-way, and concluded that it could not be said as 
a matter of law that she was guilty of contributory 
negligence. Another case on this pont is Bo?ster vs. 
Cooper, 188 Minn. 364, 247 NW 250. Plaintiff first 
saw defendant's car some two blocks away, saw it 
again when it was 200 feet away, but not again till 
it was right upon him. It was urged that his failure 
to continue to watch and avoid being struck by the 
car made him guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. But the court said that where he had 
the right-of-way for the reason as stated in the Jen-
sen case just referred to the question of his contrib-
utory negligence was for the jury." 
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In the case of Lowder vs. Holly, Utah, 233 P(2) 350, 
in which the plaintiff Lowder failed to see the defendant's 
truck approaching the intersection, the court reasoned that 
when the plaintiff stopped at the intersecion the approach-
ing truck was far enough away to have afforded plaintiff 
an opportunity to safely cross and that the plaintiff could 
have assumed and acted on the assumption that the driver 
of the defendant's truck would exercise ordinary reasonable 
care in his driving and it would be safe to cross the intersec-
tion. 
"Under such a state of facts Lowder's failure to see 
the truck could in no way have contributed to the 
accident." 
Quoting further, 
"In other words, even if he had seen the approaching 
truck, it could have been found, consistent with due 
care for plaintiff to assume that he would be afforded 
his right-of-way because of entering the intersection 
first and proceed across. So the accident might well 
have happened just as it did, whether Lowder saw 
the defendant or not." 
On the same point is the ruling in Hess vs. Robinson, 109 
Utah 60, 163 P(2) 510, where the plaintiff failed to see an 
ambulance coming into the intersection from the west. The 
court said: 
"It was a jury question as to whether even if plain-
tiff had seen the ambulance the jury could have found 
it to be within his duty of care to think that the 
ambulance would obey the stop sign and that he was 
entitled to proceed until it became apparent to him 
that the ambulance was not going to do so, so that 
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it wa~ a question of fact whether even if he had seen 
it he would have realized it was not going to obey 
the stop sign in time to have avoided the accident. 
Consequently, the question of proximate cause; that 
i ~. whether the accident would have happened irre-
spective of his negligence in failing to see the ambu-
lance was properly submitted to the jury. See Poulson 
vs. lllanness, Utah 241 P(2) 152." 
Certainly the facts in the Nelson case before this court 
are ~tronger in favor of the plaintiff Nelson than were the 
facts in the case of Coombs vs. Perry. The Hutchings vehicle 
was traveling at such a slow speed that Mrs. Nelson would 
have at any time up to the time of impact, if she had looked 
at the approaching vehicle, anticipated that the driver was 
watching her and that he would stop before running into 
her, and afford her her right-of-way. 
In the case of Edith M. Langlois vs. Nor man T. Reese, 
(the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, sitting with a jury), where-
in the plaintiff was crossing State Street at a "T" intersec-
tion where there was no crosswalk this court, although hold-
ing the plaintiff guilty of negligence in crossing the street 
at other than at a marked crosswalk, nevertheless submitted 
the case to the jury on the question of proximate cause. In 
that case the plaintiff before crossing the street looked both 
ways on Sate Street and also looked up First Avenue before 
she started to cross, but she stated that the way was clear 
and she didn "t see the vehicle. There was no question but 
what the case '""as properly submitted to the jury for its 
determination as to the question of proximate cause on the 
negligence of the plaintiff. 351 P(2) 638, 10 Ut. (2) 272. 
In the case of Fox vs. Taylor, 10 Utah (2) 174, 350 
P (2) 154, Miss Fox was crossing 5th South Street at a 
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point between 1Oth and 11th East. She was crossing from 
south to north and as she approached the street she looked 
to the west and saw no automobiles coming eastward on 5th 
South, but did see the defendant stopped at the 1Oth East 
intersection, about % of a block away. Without making fur-
ther observation, she proceeded to cross the street. Mean-
while, the defendant was coming easterly in the inside lane 
toward her at a speed of between 25 and 30 miles per hour, 
and when the plaintiff had nearly reached the center island 
which is in that street the defendant's car struck her throwing 
her to the ground and causing her injury. She was crossing 
at a point other than in a crosswalk, and in that case the 
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was held to 
have been properly submitted to the jury. 
In the case of Charvoz vs. Cottrell, 12 Utah( 2) 25, 361 
P(2) 516, the decedent was crossing 17th South Street on 
the west side of the intersection of 17th South and 19th East 
Street during the nighttime. The decedent was walking with-
in a marked crosswalk. The defendant Cottrell was driving 
east on 17th South Street and struck the decedent as the de-
cedent entered into the eastbound lane of traffic. The deced-
ent made a statement to his mother at the hospital that he 
did not see the defendant's automobile approaching. The 
court in that -case held that the question of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence and the defendant's negligence was prop-
erly submitted to the jury. 
In the case of Clarke vs. Tatum, U. S. Court of Ap-
peals, Virginia, 21 Automobile Cases (2) 657, plaintiff 
brought an action to recover for personal injuries sustained 
when he was struck by defendant's automobile while cross-
ing in a crosswalk with the traffic light in his favor. The 
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clt·ft·ndant had stopped for the red light facing him and 
activated his left turn signal. When the light turned green 
for him and was red for the pedestrian, he started his left 
turn. The pedestrian never did see him. The pedestrian 
was struck on the left ~ide when near the center of the 
~~ reet, but still in the crosswalk, by the right front fender 
of defendant's automobile. Plaintiff had no idea where 
defendant\, car came from except that it came from his 
left. Defendant did not see plaintiff. Defendant conceded 
his negligence. The court said: 
··\\r e cannot say that plaintiff who was crossing the 
~lreet at a proper place, and who had the right-of-way 
over defendant's vehicle, was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law in failing to keep a 
constant lookout for approaching vehicles from his 
left. Such a question is almost always one for the 
trier of the facts, and this is not one of the excep-
tional cases where recovery should be denied as a 
matter of law." 
The court further quotes: 
·"Certainly under the factual situation here involved, 
reasonable minds might well differ as to whether 
the plaintiff exercised care for his own safety, or 
'ras guilty of contributory negligence which would 
bar his recovery." 
Section 6628 of Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 
and Practice, \'olume lOB, at page 149, reads as follo,vs: 
"It is an exceptional case in which a plaintiff's right 
of recovery should be denied as a matter of law, 
when he has been injured while walking upon a 
public thoroughfare, and it is the general rule that 
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the issue of whether pedestrians or others on foot 
have been contributorily negligent is one for the 
. " JUry. 
In the case of Chevalley vs. Degar, Ohio, 52 NE (2) 
544, which involved an accident at an intersection where 
there was a traffic light, the court stated: 
"A pedestrian, before stepping on a street at an inter-
section, must look in both directions for vehicular 
traffic, and whether a pedestrian should look again, 
in the exercise of ordinary care, is a question for the 
jury under proper instructions." 
Our own approved jury instructions, set out in J.I.F.U. 
20.3, 20.8 only places the obligation of reasonable care 
under the circumstances and is in accord with the general 
rule. 
In the case of Lout is vs. Bishop, Oregon 1960, 21 Auto-
mobile Cases, ( 2) 355, plaintiff was crossing in a marked 
crosswalk. Before starting to cross she looked to the left 
and to the right. She saw the headlights of a car at least 
two blocks away; she thought that she had plenty of time. 
She was struck as she approached the opposite side of the 
street. The court said: 
"It is a question for the jury whether she was negli-
gent and negligence was the proximate cause in her 
not looking again." 
In the case of Galatzer vs. Schwartz, Illinois, 1960, 20 
Automobile Cases (2) 891, plaintiff, a pedestrian, was in· 
jured when she was struck by a left turning car at a crosswalk 
on a bright afternoon. The trial court submitted the issues 
of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory 
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negligence for not seeing the defendant's vehicle ahead of 
her which went out about to the center of the intersection 
and then turned left and into the plaintiff. Jury returned 
a ver·dict of $11,000 for plaintiff who appealed on the 
i~~ue that the damages were inadequate and that the court 
~t.ould have directed a verdict for the plaintiff and not 
~ubmitted the question of contributory negligence. The 
Supreme Court held the trial court should have directed 
the verdict and submitted only the issue of damages. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GUIL-
TY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATIER OF LAW AND THAT THE 
ONLY ISSUE FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE WAS WHETHER 
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE 0'F 
HER INJUR·Y. 
Defendant has filed a cross appeal claiming error in 
the court's failing to give defendant's requested instruction 
~0. -l. 
The court did not err in not giving the defendant's 
requested instruction. Whether or not defendant was guilty 
of negligence was a jury question as also was the question 
of whether the negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of 
the accident. Plaintiff's argument contained in its main 
brief in support of plaintiff's appeal fully covers the plain-
tiff' 5 position. The cases and authorities cited by plaintiff 
unanimously support the holding that the matter was proper-
ly submitted to the jury at the trial. 
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The jury had to consider the question of proximate 
cause before it could find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
The jury has found, therefore, that the plaintiff's conduct 
was not a proximate cause of her own injuries. The de-
fendant was not entitled to such an instruction but if it 
was entitled to it, the court's failure to give it was harm-
less error because the jury did find under proper instruc-
tions that plaintiff's conduct was not a proximate cause of 
the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the facts the plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The cases 
are unanimous in holding that a jury question exists where 
the plaintiff, pedestrian, has a red light in her favor and 
the trial court erred in granting defendant a judgment not-
withstanding the jury verdict. The jury verdict should be 
reinstated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Cross Respondent 
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